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The New School

DAVID KENNEDY
This paper traces the changing status of the school as a
counter culture in the anthropological and historical literature,
in particular from the moment when compulsory mass
schooling assumed the function of ideological state apparatus
in the post-revolutionary 19th century West. It then focuses
attention on what may be called the New School, which could
be said to represent an evolved, postmodern embodiment of
the social archetype of the school as interruption of the status
quo. It emerged in the form of schools initially associated with
Romanticism and with socialist libertarian or ‘anarchist’
impulses, and moved, if temporarily, into the educational
mainstream in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the left
sector of the Progressive Education movement, proliferated in
the 1960s and 70s in various school reform movements, and is
a constant presence today in the theory and practice of those
schools that identify themselves as ‘democratic’. It is based on
principles of adult–child dialogue and direct democratic
practice. Examples that we have of the New School tend to be
characterised by material and activity environments that value
variety, emergence, choice, emotional safety, self-initiation
and self-organisation; that are multi-sensorial and
polysymbolic; and that are organised on the principles
associated with mastery learning, social learning theory and
play theory—that is, moderate complexity and optimal
cognitive arousal as exemplary conditions for learning.
SCHOOL AS DISRUPTION

In a broad, comprehensive and well-documented volume on the prehistorical and historical anthropology of childhood, cultural anthropologist
David Lancy (2008) traces the patterns of educational ‘folk models’ from
pre-modern societies to the present, using examples ranging from the aboriginal to the urban contemporary. The most striking observation that emerges
from his overview is the cultural and epistemological divide that asserts
itself, beginning with the rise of the ‘village school’ in transitional early
agricultural societies, between formal and informal schooling. Lancy documents several cases in which tensions between, not just parents and school
but parents and children are generated by the appearance in the village of
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another class, carriers of ‘modern’ town culture—schoolteachers who have
come to train village children in unfamiliar and locally useless knowledge
and skills. On the promise of some as yet unmanifested future advantage—
an advantage that will ultimately lead to their children abandoning them
for the town—villagers are robbed of both their children’s labour and their
cultural loyalty. Current functional informal educational forms that are part
of the village economy—the ‘chore curriculum’ and apprenticeship—are
undermined by children’s removal to the schoolhouse, but that is not all. The
village school, that place apart, also introduces cultural and personal dehiscence on deeper levels. The epistemological, ontological and metaphysical
convictions that are traditionally inscribed through the deep, experiential
indoctrination of the chore curriculum, apprenticeship and the ‘bush school’
or initiation hut—where adolescents are plunged into the spiritual mysteries
of the culture—are eroded on a fundamental level by the introduction of
new, conflicting literacies, in particular Western ‘school’ literacy, which
privileges Aristotelian logic, mathematical reasoning, and analytic decontextualisation, and has been shown to lead to different ways of reading and
representing the world (Bruner, Olver and Greenfield, 1966; Lancy, 1983;
Ong, 1982)—in short to new and unfamiliar regimes of knowledge, identity
and belief.
Speaking broadly, we may say that the village school as counterculture is
the first modern institution, if we understand the prime impulse of modernity
to be the interruption and disruption of cultural epistemologies and forms of
life in the interest of an allegedly better future. It has traditionally presumed
to prepare people to enter new worlds, the world of the town and city, of
‘progress’, of new markets, new forms of work, of the scientific method, of
new class and religious identities—in particular the rising middle classes, or
bourgeoisie. Also speaking broadly, we may suggest that, with the triumph
of the bourgeoisie, we are at the end of schooling as disruption; that, starting
in the 19th century with the rise of universal, compulsory state-sponsored
and controlled education, formal schooling assumed the function of an ideological state apparatus, dedicated to biopower and governmentality—to the
production, in Rousseau’s (1956) classic formulation, of the ‘citizen’ rather
than the ‘[hu]man’. There has, in other words, been a historic reversal, and
the school has become another socialising and normalising function of the
global village, not a place apart, but an institution dedicated to the reproduction of the social, political, economic class structures, predicated on the
performance principle, that serve global capitalism. At this point of apparent
entropy and stagnation of modernity, the cultural disruption that school as
a counterculture initiates moves from between school and village to within
school itself, and the problem of student alienation and resistance—that
is, youth as counterculture, as representative of frustrated new values—
becomes a central theme of the scholastic experience (McLaren, 2006). Jan
Masschelein and Maarten Simons (2014) refer to this as a process of the
‘taming’ of the school—of its appropriation by state and economic powers,
and its growth as a colonial outpost of the corporate state. In a situation
of repression of the free impulses of this form of gathering, there is still
disruption, but it is internal—student resistance and rebellion against the

C 2018

The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

The New School

107

system. Here the disruption takes the form, according to Peter McLaren, of
‘resistance with . . . utopian potential as students attempt to ritually construct a transitional world that could erase the past and deconstruct present
psycho-social adaptations in order to forge new self-presentations of greater
potency’ (quoted in Stanley 1992, p. 204). This form of revolt, in fact, tends
to reinforce the status quo; that is, youth has taken on the disruptive, deterritorialising role formally played by the teacher from out of town, and the
inmates are running the asylum.
In yet a third historical transformation of the deterritorialising function
of ‘school’ in the West, there arose in the early 19th century, in reaction
and resistance to the increasing hegemony of state-imposed compulsory
education in the service of economy and class, a movement in fits and
starts, patchy and episodic, often ephemeral, which I will call the New
School, which emerged in the form of schools initially associated with
Romanticism and with socialist libertarian or ‘anarchist’ impulses, and often
with countercultural communities. They moved, if temporarily, halfway into
the educational mainstream in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the left
sector of the Progressive Education movement, proliferated in the 1960s and
70s in various school reform movements, and are a constant presence today
in the theory and practice of those schools (and of those individual teachers
relatively isolated in conventional schools, of which no doubt there are
many) that identify with the Democratic School Movement, the Alternative
Educational Resource Organization, the Coalition of Essential Schools, and
other similar networks and alliances, not to speak of the multiple facets
of home- and unschooling that have emerged in the last 30 years. In this
dialectical movement, the school has reclaimed, if in a completely different
key, its archetypal identity as a site of personal and cultural interruption, as a
place-set-apart in which new literacies and new epistemologies are explored.
In this case, however, it identifies itself as a counterculture dedicated to
intergenerational dialogue and to an emancipatory future, an outpost of
personal and social reconstruction, of new ways of reading the world, of
new technologies, and of emergent philosophical convictions; that is to say,
it identifies itself with the very utopian potential of which student alienation
and rebellion are negative signs.
The New School could be said to represent an evolved, postmodern embodiment of the social archetype of the school as interruption of the status
quo—a negation of the negation—which is distinctive from the original ‘village school’ in several ways. First, the New School is now in a position to fulfill the basic social conditions of the counterculture archetype; it is, as a place
set apart from the everyday world of production, an intergenerational intentional community—a place in which adults and children come together for a
certain purpose—in this case, broadly speaking, ‘study’. More specifically,
the school is—rather than a colonial outpost intent on a hostile takeover of
indigenous culture—an adult–child collective, and as such, the site for the
interaction between two or more generations, with all that implies of transmission, problematisation, inquiry, guidance, resistance, innovation, rebellion, conversation, fellowship, agon, tension, understanding and misunderstanding, performance, labour, celebration, ritual, micropolitics, and so on.
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As an adult–child collective, it is what John Dewey, who first sketched out its
principles at the turn of the 20th century, called a ‘miniature community’, or
‘embryonic society’. Both terms evoke the archetype of intentional community: a shared space, small in scale and separated from the social space of the
mainstream, in which the structure and dynamics of knowledge and power
of the larger community—indeed, of the human community in general—are
expressed, played out, represented and explored on a ‘miniature’ ‘embryonic’ scale, and thereby assume a psychosocial intensity that is in inverse
proportion to their size. It is in short—unless repressed by hierarchy and
domination—a powerful performative and experimental zone, a laboratory
for the emergence of new forms of understanding and even practice, a social
adventure and living theatre, a space in which literacies are not just reproduced but reconstructed, and where the organisation and exercise of power
and influence (politics) are confronted and potentially reshaped at their most
basic level through the experience of shared, participatory governance.
CHILDHOOD AND DEMOCRACY

Two major historical developments have made it possible for the counterculture archetype to reappear in the form of the New School, the first of
which has to do with the history of the adult–child relationship, and the
second with the history of democracy as a form of emancipatory practice;
nor are the two unconnected. As for the first, we may trace a historical
movement, articulated broadly in Lloyd deMause’s (1974) psychohistorical analysis, which is based on the assumption that ‘psychic structure must
always be passed from generation to generation through the narrow funnel
of childhood’ (p. 3).1 DeMause describes the dialectical evolution of the
adult–child relationship as a series of ‘closer approaches’ between adult and
child, with ‘each closing of the psychic distance producing fresh anxiety.
The reduction of this adult anxiety is the main source of the child-reading
practices of each age’ (p. 3), and the evolution of those practices depends on
‘the ability of each successive generation of parents to regress to the psychic
age of their children and work through the anxieties of that age in a better
manner the second time they encounter them than they did during their own
childhood’ (p. 3). He proposes three basic forms of adult reaction to what
for him is a sort of primal scene—that is, ‘what happens when an adult is
face to face with a child who needs something’ (p. 6). In the ‘projective
reaction’, the adult, as his own childhood need is triggered by the child’s
neediness, ‘uses the child as a vehicle for projection of the contents of his
own unconscious’. In the ‘reversal reaction’, the adult ‘uses the child as a
substitute for an adult figure important in his own childhood’; and in the
‘empathic reaction’, he or she is able to ‘regress to the level of a child’s
need and correctly identify it without an admixture of [his or her] own reactions’, all the while ‘maintaining enough distance from the need to be able
to satisfy it’ (p. 7)—that is, avoiding the emotional contamination or ‘highjacking’ in which her own emotional need is triggered by the child’s acting
out of hers, resulting in violence, neglect or abandonment. The empathic
reaction depends, in other words, on a moment of regression that allows the
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adult to actually feel what the child is feeling, made possible by what in
psychoanalytic parlance is called a ‘withdrawal of the projection’—which
may more accurately be called a resistance to the projection of her own
‘shadow materials’ onto the child, whereby she construes the child as bad,
evil, selfish, unreasonably needy, uncontrollable, perverse, etc. On this account, the engine of psychohistorical evolution lies in the adult’s capacity
to stop seeing their own dark psychological matter in their children.
DeMause holds that, in the earliest historically dominant childrearing
modes—the ‘infanticidal’ and the ‘abandoning’—the intensity of the projective and reversal reactions resulted in widespread dehumanisation of
children, as expressed first in a general acceptance of infanticide, followed
by a period in which abandonment was common, followed by ‘ambivalence’
(the third mode), in which the child starts to be recognised as an individual,
but still carries dangerous projections that often result in sudden punitive
outbursts by adults. With the rise of the ‘intrusive’ mode in early modernity,
which corresponds with the rise of school as a disciplinary apparatus of the
state, the shadow projection is not completely withdrawn, but still located in
the child and identified—with the help of Augustinian religious ideology—
as original sin. Associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie, children are
broadly understood by adults in the intrusive mode as in a condition of
ignorance, impulsivity and ‘willfulness’—a condition not just of deficit but
danger—and in need of forceful shaping in order, as Erasmus put it, to avoid
becoming ‘worse than wild beasts’. Intrusive education under the sign of
the deficit model is understood as the application of force in the interest of
the production of adults from the raw and ambivalent material of childhood.
This mode corresponds with the modern imperial nation state’s project of
universal compulsory education, which is dedicated to the production of
‘citizens’ from the alien material of the ‘lower’ classes (Finkelstein, 1975,
1976, 1979, 1985a, 1985b, 1989; Nasaw, 1979): production of the repressed
out of the unrepressed, the reality principle out of the pleasure principle,
and of superego out of id. In this mode, the adult–child collective is primarily a disciplinary institution, analogous to the prison, the military and
factory (Foucault, 1978), its stated goal being the ‘reform’ of childhood in
the forcible creation of adults out of the animalic, and even demonic chaos
of infantile impulse. Here, all the inherently reconstructive possibilities and
processes characteristic of a ‘miniature community’ mentioned above are
violently suppressed in a closed, hierarchical system in which the performance of power is one-sided and absolute. Schooling in the intrusive mode
is in effect an imperial penal colony, in which the child, analogous to the
‘aboriginal’ or ‘native’, the domesticated woman, the ‘lower classes’, the
mad, and more recently the ‘queer’, represent the enemy at the gates of
‘Western civilisation’. The child, as Dudley and Novak’s (1972) volume
on the idea of the ‘savage’ in Western colonial imagination suggests, is the
most dangerous of all, for she is an enemy not at but within the gates—the
‘wild man’ in the bosom of the ‘civilised’ family, repression’s ‘savage’
displacement.
In the ‘socialising’ mode—with which the New School, under the influence of Enlightenment and Romantic ontologies (the most prominent being
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Rousseau’s Emile), organismic theory, and Arminian theology, has its original impulse—an emergent adult ‘psychoclass’ has discovered/invented the
lawfulness of human development, and now understands the child as an
organism, driven by internal forces of growth and reorganisation. The adult
has, in other words, recognised the good (or at least value neutral) animality
of children, and the role of the teacher is to construct and manipulate environments, curricular and pedagogical, that act to shape, through both limitation
and encouragement, reward and punishment, those internal forces—or, in
John Dewey’s (1988[1922]) term, ‘impulses’—toward a ‘successful’ adulthood. This mode represents, in deMause’s formulation, a further psychohistorical stage in the withdrawal of the projection in the recognition of children
as individuals in their own right, albeit embroiled in the vicissitudes of development. With the transition in the mid-20th century into the ‘empathic’
or ‘helping’ mode, that withdrawal is as complete as it can ever be given the
central role of projection in perception itself. Here, the child’s real or potential agency is assumed, respected and encouraged, her form of reason recognised, her failures and regressions tolerated. She has become a full-fledged
interlocutor—an Other whose singularity is acknowledged, with whom dialogue is the preferred discourse, and whose differences qua child from adult
have become starting points rather than disqualifications in that dialogue.
The shadow projections that are ‘withdrawn’ or resisted in the empathic
mode—egocentrism, impulsivity, innate jealousy, a sense of inferiority
and/or superiority, irrational anger, covetous and concupiscent impulses,
etc.—are in fact the materials that, when projected onto and thus reified
in others, nourish the psychosocial roots of hierarchy, domination and exploitation; they lie close to the surface of the authoritarian personality. As
such, they are at the source of anti-democratic habits, practices, forms and
traditions. When empathic adults are confronted with the impulsivity, emotional lability and unregulated, egocentric behaviours of their children, they
recognise parenting and school teaching as a form of self-work—work with
their own shadow material, which makes of it an educative relationship for
adults as well as children. This recognition sets the stage for understanding
the adult–child collective of school as a site, not just for intergenerational
transmission of a regime of knowledge—which is our most common understanding of school—but as a site for the deconstruction of authoritarian
relational patterns, and the reconstruction of psychosocial habit through
dialogue; in short, what deMause identifies as a new ‘psychoclass’. The
adult who is sensitised to her own shadow material and resists its projection onto others is to that extent freed to see children, like adults, as
singularities—unique individuals who bring new possibility into the world.
The implication of the historical emergence of the empathic psychoclass
for the archetype of school is that, in its identity as a site of adult–child dialogue rather than adult domination, it becomes the laboratory for that form
of ‘associated living and conjoint communicative experience’ that Dewey
(1916) identified as ‘social democracy’, which, he argues, is the necessary
and sufficient condition for authentic political democracy. As an embryonic society in the empathic mode, the New School is the laboratory of the
democratic personality. This is accomplished, not just in the visible but in
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the ‘invisible’ curriculum, which is in fact highly visible in the organisation
of power, agency and voice on all levels, from the choice and delivery of
what is to be studied, to how conflict within the community is addressed,
to the structure and details of school governance. As a prototypical democratic institution, the New School reclaims and vindicates the essence of the
archetype of ‘school’ as an intrinsically culturally transformative counterculture, the site of new ways of reading the world and acting within it—a
‘community of learners’ that is ‘participatory, pro-active, communal, and
collaborative’ (Bruner, 1996, p. 84).
DIMENSIONS OF THE NEW SCHOOL

As already mentioned, we have numerous and in fact ever-emerging examples and exemplars of the New School, now understood as a school based
on principles of adult–child dialogue and direct democratic practice. What
to include as necessary and sufficient conditions of such a school may ultimately be unanswerable, but we can identify at least six dimensions of
practice for analysis:

r
r
r
r
r
r

built space;
grouping patterns and principles;
organisation of knowledge (curriculum);
materials of knowledge (texts and concrete materials);
communication (pedagogy); and
governance (the exercise of power).

And we may evaluate them in terms of the system characteristics of ‘open’ or
‘closed’. Although binarisation is inherently dangerous, the virtual always
lurks in the actual, and closed systems may be sub-parts of open systems and
vice versa, we can identify contrasting system characteristics—for example:

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

static
uniform
centralised
segmented
monological
predictable
authoritarian
imperative

fluid
transitional
decentralised
non-linear
dialogical, multiform, polyvocal
barely predictable
democratic
interlocutive

Examples that we have of the New School tend to create material and activity environments that value richness, variety, emergence, choice, emotional
safety, self-initiation and self-organisation, and part-whole integration; that
are multi-sensorial and polysymbolic; and that are organised on the principles associated with mastery learning, social learning theory and play
theory—that is, moderate complexity and optimal cognitive arousal as exemplary conditions for learning. Finally, the principles of whole-community
self-governance are perhaps the most controversial among these criteria, but
in fact they are the one necessary (if not sufficient) condition of the New
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School as dialogical and democratic. If this is the case, we might argue that
the original Summerhill model, founded in 1922, whose one chief identifying criterion is governance through weekly meetings in which one person
has one vote (Neill, 1960), remains the most advanced exemplar of the New
School today.
Each of these criteria is made possible, as I have argued above, by cultural
evolutionary shifts in the popular understanding of two fields of belief—the
nature and potentialities of childhood, and the ideal of direct democracy
as a form of political life. Both of these shifts can be traced, intellectually
anyway, to the revolutionary Enlightenment and Romantic emergence in
the late 18th and early 19th centuries of explicitly anti-hierarchical philosophies, which are in turn based, in philosophers like Proudhon, Fourier,
Kropotkin and Landauer (Krimerman and Perry, 1966; Marshall, 2010),
on a repudiation of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, and a view of human
nature as intrinsically capable of self-regulation, cooperation, and collective thriving without (or in spite of) the social pathologies of hierarchy and
domination—philosophies which have in turn been reflected in the empirical inquiries of human ethology, evolutionary biology and sociobiology in
the 20th century (Kappeler and van Schaik, 2006; Tomasello, 2009), not to
speak of a steady stream of anarcho-socialist and direct democratic social
experiments of which education has been a fundamental dimension (Avrich,
2006; Rexroth, 1974, Suissa, 2010, Vesey, 1973). For some evolutionary
biologists (Gould, 1977; Montagu, 1989) childhood has come to represent the iconic characteristic of and hope for the species in the concepts
of ‘neoteny’—the evolutionary significance and potential offered by our
extraordinarily long childhood and thus unique possibilities for neuronal
development—and ‘paedomorphism’, or the extent to which homo sapiens,
in comparison with its forbears, is marked throughout the life-cycle by both
physiological and psychological childlike features—flat face, hairlessness,
small jaw, large head, globular skull, etc.; and urge for novelty, playfulness,
curiosity, wonder, plasticity, adaptiveness and so on (Bjorklund, 1997). On
this account, the New School carries the banner for an emergent optimistic
view of human nature, one that is initiated and reinforced if not ultimately
justified by the organismic theme of the philosophical biology of the late
19th and 20th centuries—a theoretical approach inaugurated, rhetorically
anyway, in Rousseau’s pre-revolutionary invocation of ‘Nature’ in Emile,
a book enormously popular in its time. In deMause’s evolutionary schema,
organismic theory exemplifies the ‘socialising’ child-rearing mode, which
still understands the child as incomplete, animalic, impulse-driven, undisciplined, but guided by a genetic developmental plan oriented towards growth
and ‘healthy’ adaptation. For the socialising educator, the child is a river of
which she is the banks, and whose current she guides.
The conventional school, on the other hand, is still marked, however
‘softly’, by the shadow of the intrusive mode, for which the child is untamed chaotic energy, empty of knowledge and significant experience, easily seduced by evil, and requiring that the adult actually ‘reach inside’ the
child through the strictest of disciplines and rearrange her, in order to save
her from her own dangerous impulses. As an ideological state apparatus,
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the conventional school is understood as a disciplinary and normalising
institution, dedicated to social reproduction. And as I have already argued,
there is an analogical relationship between the dominant bourgeois culture’s
view of the unruly subaltern classes they are called to domesticate through
schooling and the adult view of children: both are understood as ‘wild’—in
need of shaping, disciplining, reconstructing, manipulating into a form of
adulthood rendered docile through the instillation of mechanisms of surplus
repression. This view of school as a domesticating agent is present from the
most naked assertions of its necessity in the architects of public schooling
in the early 19th century (see Blechman, 1975) to its many exemplars today.
Its pedagogical signature is behaviorism—the shaping of desire through the
manipulative administration of reward and punishment, pain and pleasure.
Behaviourism represents a blend of the intrusive and socialising modes: it
embodies the latter in that it views child as an organism—reactive, sensitive
flesh in some kind of adaptive relationship with environment. It embodies
the former in that it sees that relationship as needing adjustment by an
external intervention, because the human organism, flawed as it is, has no
internal regulator, no inherent direction. As such it is potentially dangerous,
capable of monstrous growth; and the ‘environment’ must be appropriated
by adults and engineered algorithmically in the form of rewards and punishments. Pleasure and pain are wielded as tools by the masters, who implicitly
understand themselves as of a different order of being from the protoplasmic entities whose galvanic responses they manipulate. Behaviorism is
capitalist psychology—in its deterritorialisation, its ignorance of context,
its anti-ecological violence, and in the exploitative relationship it sets up
between adults and children. It should be no surprise that the founder of
American behaviorism John B. Watson, after leaving the academy, enjoyed
a second career as a highly successful CEO in mass advertising.
The New School is imaginable in the socialising mode—in fact it may be
said to characterise the implicit child-rearing mode of the moderate wing
of the Progressive Education movement of the first half of the 20th century,
which operated on organismic and developmental principles, and produced
an interesting variety of educational forms that recognised the child as capable of intrinsic motivation and as inherently self-organising. Dewey, whose
more general statements about youth and age tend fall into the left-leaning
range of that mode, set the stage at the turn of the century for the switch
to the empathic or helping mode by exposing the gap between child and
curriculum, school and society (1902). In The Child and the Curriculum,
he identified a hiatus between child and adult forms of the organisation of
knowledge and the path of inquiry that makes dialogue a necessity. Fifteen years later, he and his daughter Evelyn Dewey published a firsthand
account of a handful of contemporary progressive schools (2003[1915])
which acted as a set of philosophical notes from the front lines of the battle
to close the gap between child and curriculum and forge the New School.
Roughly two decades after that, in Experience and Education (1938) he
challenged the polarisation between the overly permissive and laissez-faire
‘child centered’ and the strict, inflexible ‘traditional’ disciplinary school,
accusing them both of missing the mark, and implicitly calling for a form of
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schooling that satisfied both children’s intrinsic inquiry-based interests and
adults’ felt need for intergenerational transmission of knowledge. Developmental and comparative psychologist Michael Tomasello (2009) refers
to this adult exigency as the cultural characteristic of ‘cumulative cultural
evolution’, whereby each level of cultural advance ‘stays solidly in the
group’s repertoire until someone comes up with something even newer and
more improved’ (xi), a process which he refers to as ‘cultural ratcheting’.
The extent to which the polarisation that Dewey identifies is in fact a dialectical one—which is connected to the question of how much, if at all,
the traditional, ‘disciplinary’ form of schooling that pervades the American
public educational system has been influenced by the empathic form—is a
complicated one and, for purposes of this analysis, moot.
From a psychohistorical perspective, both The Child and the Curriculum
and Experience and Education may be seen as challenging the emergent
empathic psychoclass—which had rejected the deficit model of childhood
and both the intrusive and the socialising modes—to develop a form of
schooling based on the recognition of ‘child’ as inherently agentic, selforganising, and inquiry driven, and to invent a dialogical pedagogy based
on a theory of experience that allowed, as he put it elsewhere, for ‘a release
of capacities that have not previously functioned’, which in a process of
‘continuous reconstruction’ undergo ‘a steady reorganisation of habits to
meet new elements in new situations’, which leads to the formation of
‘habits . . . which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more
informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and
sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current’, in the interest
of ‘a future new society of changed purposes and desires’ (1988[1922],
pp. 96, 101, 104, 128, 284, 285, passim).
DIALOGUE, EMERGENCE, AUTHORITY, ORDER AND AGENCY

The New School as the expression of an emergent psychoclass may be
said to be based on the two core principles of dialogue and emergence.
The empathic mode is based on dialogue to the extent that it recognises the
adult–child relationship as one of equals on some fundamental level, and
because it understands each child as a singularity and a representative of
Arendtian natality. Persons in dialogue make mutual demands, from which
a third thing emerges. A school that embodies the species-wide principle
of cumulative cultural evolution, which demands transmission, and the
principle of natality, which demands free inquiry, must resolve the tension
between them. I want to suggest that the origins of this tension within the educational relationship can best be understood in the contexts of the implicit
beliefs held by a culture—beliefs not just about the nature of childhood and
children, but about the nature of good, evil, change, the legitimate use of
power and the scope and limits of communal responsibility. In the West, the
deconstruction of authoritarian relational patterns and the transformation of
psychosocial habit through dialogue has been spearheaded by theorists in the
discourses of philosophical anarchism, which found its modern voice in the
revolutionary ferment of the late 18th and 19th centuries (Blechman, 1975;
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Krimerman and Perry, 1966, pp. 185–206). At least one libertarian socialist
thread of 19th century anarchist thought, in rejecting hierarchy, patriarchy
and domination in any form, argued for another ‘state of nature’ than
the Hobbesian ‘diffidence, competition, and glory’ model, emphasising
cooperation, ‘mutual aid’, and what Pierre-Joseph Proudhon identified as
‘collective reason’ or ‘force’ (Marshall, 2010, p. 248) as fundamental evolutionary impulses. In identifying these impulses as primary ‘instinctual’
tendencies, they drew an ontological distinction between authoritarian and
libertarian narratives at the level of human nature itself. Hobbesian human
nature is ‘red in tooth and claw’, while for anarchist theory both tendencies
are present. In fact anarchism—which Noam Chomsky (2013) identifies as
an expression of the ‘true intention’ of Enlightenment ideals—refuses any
essentialist notion of a pre-social human nature but rather identifies it as
‘twofold’ and visible only in a social, cultural and historical context (Suissa,
2010, pp. 28–29). Peter Kropotkin saw a dialectical tension between the
principles of struggle for existence and mutual aid, egoism and sociability,
competition and ‘a propensity for spontaneous cooperation and mutual aid
within human society’, and identified this dialectic as a driver of social
evolution (ibid., p. 27; Krimerman and Perry, 1966, pp. 223–237).
Tracing a genealogy of philosophical anarchism is a complicated and
tortuous task, and beyond the scope of this paper, ranging as it does from
the radical individualism of a Max Stirner to the straight-up socialism of
Robert Owen. To the extent that the New School understands itself as
a participatory democratic collective in the strongest sense of that term, it
was also nourished throughout the 19th century by anarcho-Romantic themes
(Fulford, 2006; Thompson, 1997) on both sides of the Atlantic, whether in
Coleridge’s unrealised American ‘pantisocracy’, or in what might be termed
the democratic ‘metaphysics’ of Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman; in postChristian Unitarian and Quaker radical egalitarian impulses (e.g. the Brook
Farm experiment); in multiple communal ventures in the 19th century US
and the 1960s counterculture (Rexroth, 1974; Vesey, 1973); and in the 20th
and 21st centuries; and by call the anarcho-democratic theory and practice
of a recognisable if unclassified school of philosophers and educational
activists, all of whom recognise the social, economic, moral and ethical
failures of predatory capitalism and the ‘inverted totalitarianism’ of its
‘managed democracies’ (Wolin, 2010).2
As a form of governance, anarcho-democratic theory calls for the realisation of our species’ capacity for operating without a hierarchical leadership
structure or a form of order that depends on domination and the threat of
violence, and which is based on decentralised, bottom-up, self-organising
principles of association and consensus-based, direct democratic decisionmaking practices (Graeber, 2004)—or, as Chomsky (2013) put it, ‘an antistate branch of socialism, which meant a highly organised society . . . based
on democracy all the way through . . . democratic control of communities,
of workplaces, of federal structures, built on systems of voluntary association, spreading internationally’ (p. 107). As far as its articulation in specifically educational terms, John Dewey’s formulations (1916, 1984[1925])
connect anarchist and democratic ideologies most basically in a normative
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theory that defines democracy as a ‘mode of associated living, of conjoint
communicated experience’ of ‘a number of individuals who participate in
an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and
to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own’;
which leads to ‘greater individualisation on the one hand, and a broader
community of interest on the other’, (1916, pp. 87–88 passim). The school
is one of those ‘smallest units of organisation’ (Suissa, 2010) in which this
mode of experience can be learned through actual practice, and as such is a
primary form of social inquiry, an ‘experiment in human living’, an embryonic society whose promise is in ‘developing the kind of people capable of
bringing about and sustaining the free society of the future’ (ibid., p. 92).
On a more existential level, and in resonance with DeMause’s heralding
of an emergent empathic psychoclass, both Bookchin (2005) and Herbert
Marcuse (1969) invoke the emancipatory evolutionary possibility implicit
in an altered sensorium—a ‘new sensibility’ or form of ‘sensuous reason’,
a set of ‘needs and satisfactions’, a further development in what Bookchin
calls the ‘history of subjectivity’. Marcuse foresees the possibility of a ‘new
relationship between sensibility and reason’ that ‘insists on freedom as a
biological necessity’, is ‘physically incapable of tolerating any repression
other than that required for the protection and amelioration of life’, and
which, ‘prior to all ethical behavior in accordance with specific social standards, prior to all ideological expression’, has ‘an instinctual foundation
for solidarity among human beings’ (Marcuse, 1969, pp. 28,10), which is
expressed as a refusal of injustice, tyranny, privilege and exploitation. Both
thinkers speak, in the modality of what Gianni Vattimo (1992) calls ‘the
utopian telos grasped by anticipatory consciousness’ (p. 80), of an emergent
‘second nature’, corresponding to Freire’s (1970) notion of the species’ ‘unfinishedness’, and its ‘ontological and historical vocation of becoming more
fully human’ (p. 62; for which see Kennedy, 2017). Anarcho-democratic
‘school’ would then be an instance of that ‘form of gathering’ (Masschelein
and Simons, 2014) or, in Suissa’s words, ‘ongoing process of creative experimentation’ (2010, p. 39) that, given ‘the [twofold] anarchist view of
human nature . . . would not need to change human nature but merely draw
out moral qualities and tendencies already present’ (p. 40).
As an experimental prototype of the New School, anarcho-democratic
theory has been applied in many educational settings over the last 150 years
(Avrich, 2006; Krimerman and Perry, 1966; Suissa, 2010; Woodcock,
1977), and may be said to be at least partially represented in the ‘childcentered’ wing of the Progressive Education movement. As a set of beliefs
and practices, it poses three important questions to education in general
and to the institution of the school in particular. These are challenges to
the beliefs and institutional structures, not just of mainstream education,
which—however many anarcho-democratic teachers practice behind closed
doors—is still shackled with the cultural residue of the intrusive and the
ideology of the socialising modes, but with right and centre Progressive education, which often founders on the very dichotomy identified by Dewey
in 1938 (Semel and Sadovnik, 1999). These three challenges reside at the
very heart of the emergent empathic psychoclass, and have as profound an
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import for social and political theory and practice as for child-rearing and
education.
AUTHORITY

The first has to do with authority, an issue that has long been an ambiguous and problematic aspect of the adult–child relationship. Characteristic
pronouncements by intrusive mode ‘experts’ to parents such as ‘you must
take absolute control of your son’s entire being’ (Erasmus, 1990[1527],
p. 67), or ‘one must dedicate oneself beginning with the second and third
year [to] a strict obedience to parents and superiors and a trusting acceptance of all they do’ (quoted in Miller, 1990, p. 12), testify to the sense of
moral and psychological danger surrounding this issue. The implications
of anarcho-democratic theory, for which non-coercion is a fundamental
principle, suggest a clear separation between power and authority, and a
permanent tension between de jure and de facto authority (Suissa, 2010,
p. 59). Anarchist education aims to nurture a form of subjectivity that can
distinguish between rational and irrational authority (Fromm, 2013; Suissa,
2010, p. 8). The former is not taken but given by the one who places herself
under it—who recognises it as helpful in a specific context, and as arising
from a condition of natural inequality in a situation of mutual aid. The one
in rational authority has a specific skill or level of knowledge or personal
character that facilitates the goals of the one who places herself (or the
group that places itself) under that authority, who recognises that this skill
or knowledge or personal integrity is being accepted as authoritative with
the long-term goal of its internalisation by the ones who accept it as such.
Thus, authority is exercised in the interest of its becoming obsolete through
its distribution.
The clear and insistent emphasis in anarcho-democratic theory on the
rejection of irrational, anonymous and even charismatic forms of authority
is revolutionary in that it is a realisation of Kant’s (1784) decisive call
for ‘emancipation’ from a ‘self-imposed tutelage’, and the call for sapere
aude, or the courage to ‘use one’s own intelligence without the help of a
leader’. It informs the change in the view of childhood first intimated in
Rousseau’s Emile that, so to speak, moves the age of emancipation back
to birth itself: the child is understood as an inherently reasonable being
who, like all human beings, requires an enabling social context in which
to realise that reasonableness. One aspect of that enabling context is what
Kant called the ‘public use of one’s reason’ and Habermas (1984) the
‘ideal speech situation’, and it is this particular situation that the school
as ‘embryonic society’, commune, microcosm, workshop and deliberately
utopian community offers as a democratic dispositif, or, to mimic Althusser
(2008), an ‘ideological democratic apparatus’. The New School understands
itself as an institution governed by ‘direct’ democracy, and as such its
students and its teachers are being ‘schooled’ through the processes (and
vicissitudes) of a system in which the source and engine of authority is
implicitly understood as the Community, which acts as if there is a general
interest that reconciles the interests of every individual with the interests of
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the other individuals, and as if that authority can be successfully exercised
non-hierarchically.
ORDER

The issue of authority is directly—one might even say ontologically—
connected to a second question put to education by anarcho-democratic
theory, which has to do with the conviction that nature, mind and culture, to
the extent we can distinguish them, are autopoietic or self-organising processes. To borrow Fromm’s terms, ‘rational order’ is an emergent property
of any given situation. Anarchist—and I would argue ‘deep’ democratic—
theory assumes rational order to be a product of the ‘social instinct’ (Dewey,
1959/1899, p. 40) of self-and-mutual regulation, which emerges in any situation where mutual aid is an avowed both means and end, whether from
survival need or as a normative ideal (which in fact are the same thing).
Proudhon’s famous phrase ‘anarchy is the highest form of order’ (Marshall,
2010, p. 254) prefigures open systems complexity theory. Its polar opposite
‘irrational order’—order imposed through power and arbitrary authority—
is on this account a social pathology, however widespread. In neotenic
terms, closed systems tend to discourage the self-organising possibilities of
human development, both individual and relational, by inhibiting the interconnection and myelination of neurons that is a possible outcome of social
experience. It is the emergence of these more robust neurological interconnections—especially between the cognitive and emotional sub-systems
of the triune brain (Pearce, 2002)—that offers on a biological level the
possibility of the new sensibility that neotenic education promises.
Anarcho-democratic theory would hold that the school, as an archetypal form of intentional community—the ‘smallest unit of organisation’
of participatory democratic practice—is the experimental, and therefore
sometimes messy, neotenic zone in which human brains are allowed and
encouraged, through dialogic practice, to develop the personal and relational
habits that make direct democracy possible—that is, the disposition to think
for oneself; a tolerance of conflict and an ability to utilise it in the interest
of transformation; a tolerance of ambiguity and our ontological condition
of ‘unfinishedness’ (Freire, 1965); a critical and reflective attitude towards
power and authority; a capacity for self-othering that makes empathic responses possible; a collective tolerance for individual and collective periods
of regression and ‘working through’; the skills and dispositions of group
deliberation; and an instinct for what Bookchin (2005, p. 206), in his analysis of the normative anarchist commune, called ‘direct action’, which is the
behavioral prerequisite of direct democracy. Autopoietic theory assumes a
self-ordering process, which would seem to assume a telos, or normative
ideal, however implicit and elusive, and which tends to be thwarted by
excessive closed-system characteristics.
AGENCY

Bookchin’s argument that the institutionalisation of direct action depends
on the development of a certain ‘kind of citizen or public self’—that is, of a
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characteristic form of shared subjectivity—brings me to the third challenge
anarcho-democratic theory offers to the institution of schooling, which concerns, not just the school as an intentional community, but as a site for personal and political agency both internally and within the larger community.
I have argued that anarcho-democratic beliefs and values about authority,
power, governance, human nature, freedom, authority are in fact the core
ideals that are implicit when we speak of ‘deep’ or ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ ‘or
thick’ democracy, as opposed to democracy as some uneasy compromise
between Plato’s rule of the rabble and oligarchy or plutocracy. Equally important is the anarcho-democratic awareness of the inseparable connection
between the form of a school and the form of society (Suissa, 2010, pp. 3,
5), the conviction that democracy is a set of practices, and that to speak of
democratic ideals without speaking of a set of practices is meaningless.
The very possibility of understanding school as a site for the actual
practice of direct democracy depends for its credibility on the cultural reconstruction of childhood that was inaugurated in Western discourse with
Rousseau’s Emile. This new view of childhood is reflected in 1) neoteny
theory and neurological research, in the recognition that, not only does the
extended childhood of the species offer real possibilities for the emergence
of new forms of subjectivity (natality), but that the adult of the species
retains certain key characteristics of childhood throughout the life cycle
(paedomorphism) (Montagu, 1989); 2) in Freudian and post-Freudian ego
psychology, which recognises the significance of childhood in the lifecycle, and understands childhood as a form of subjectivity that is never
left behind by adults; 3) and in critical social theory, which recognises that
childhood is in fact not just historically but necessarily a cultural invention,
and a marginalised class in modern Western bourgeois culture, institutionalised in schools for purposes of indoctrination and social and psychological
reproduction by a hegemonic ruling class.
The way that these three revolutionary innovations in the adult understanding of childhood translate into the reconstruction of schooling is in a
new understanding of the adult–child relationship itself as a form of profound cultural and interpersonal dialogue, and of school as a site for intersubjective transformation. Dialogue in the most rigorous sense of the word
is based on the assumption that each interlocutor is open to being changed
through interaction with the other. This may be an ineffable concept on a psychological level, but the way it gets instantiated in the intentional community
of school is through the institutionalisation of fully participatory democratic practices and protocols at all levels. This is exemplified in the contemporary Democratic Education movement (http://www.idenetwork.org),
whose schools have instituted a juridical structure for deliberation and
decision-making among and between all individuals and all subgroups
within the collective—a directly democratic structure that aspires to be
visible, trustworthy, simple and consistent. Any issue (including determination of the curriculum) can be raised in the traditional weekly meeting,
and each person, child or adult, has one vote. Schools in which power is
shared and explored in this way give real, practical meaning to Dewey’s
notion of school as embryonic society, and provide a cultural space for
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the exercise and internalisation of habits that lead to the embodied democratic subject, in whom egalitarian instincts have become human (or ‘second’) nature. Although this is desirable and, pursuant on practical issues
of scale, possible in every human institution, it is eminently possible in
schools, because children’s neotenic characteristics—plasticity, spontaneity and polymorphism—provide a socio-biological context for personal and
social growth and transformation. The intentionally democratic school acts
as a developmental niche for this process.
Does the granting of such levels of power and agency to children in the
adult–child collective confound or confuse relations of authority between
adult and child? To recognise spontaneous self-organisation and emergent
order as species traits is to recognise children—in their status not just
as ‘humans’ but as ‘animals’—as ontologically wired for reason, in the
deepest sense of the term ‘reason’ as signifying a capacity and a natural
tendency toward self-regulation in adaptive relationships with others and
the world. When authority is not directly imposed by adults, as it typically
is in traditional schools, there is no reason to believe that most children
would not recognise and attribute it to adults, given, not just adults’ longer
experience in the world, but developmental differences as well. Buber’s
(1965[1947]) concept of dialogue with children in fact turned on a notion of
‘inclusion,’ (ibid., p. 100). In a relationship of dialogical inclusion with the
child, I assume the existence of those deliberative and judicious powers and
capacities that I find within myself as a universal organic (i.e. characteristic
of all organisms) birthright. This means that I am committed to fostering and
nurturing them, and the implicit rights and responsibilities associated with
them. In this sense I understand the child as if she were an ideal adult—a selfregulating subject-in-process—knowing full well that (like me) sometimes
she is and sometimes she is not; and trusting that the community (the
‘smallest unit of organisation’), dedicated as it is to mutual aid, will provide
an ideal speech situation—a larger reasonable disciplinary context—for that
self-regulation through direct democratic process.
Furthermore, if the school is in fact an internal site for direct action—that
is, an ethically sensitive politicised zone in which significant decisions
regarding not just governance but curriculum are reached by empowered autonomous and relational individuals working as a collective—then to close
that form of deliberation and action to the external world is contradictory,
and tends to defeat the purpose of participatory democracy. It trivialises the
ethical judgments of the community by cloistering them, and considering
them to be mere ‘practice’, or irrelevant to the larger environment. It also
isolates the educational experience by ignoring the connections between the
curriculum and the real world, and severing the natural connections between
academic and practical meanings. If a study of chemistry, for example,
provides tools for understanding the process of environmental toxification
that is a contemporary and historical reality in our time, and a study of
economics and politics leads to an analysis of how that toxification has been
allowed to proliferate unchecked, and there is an instance of unaddressed
toxification in the local or global community, why should the school as a
collective not undertake direct action, thereby educating the public through
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its own education? Other threats to the public good, at whatever scale—
whether genocidal wars, weapons proliferation, human trafficking, mass
refugee migrations—are fair game, both as objects of inquiry and as objects
of direct action. In a global situation in which what Elizabeth Kolbert
(2014) calls the ‘sixth extinction’ is already underway, the New School
must represent a challenge to the process of privatisation in late capitalist
economies and politics that shapes subjectivity towards narrow, selfinterested, fatalistic dispositions, and thus prevents a renewed commitment
to preserving and transforming the commons—a commitment that many
would say is fundamental to averting encroaching catastrophe. Democracy
as direct participatory action is learned through its actual practice.
CONCLUSION: FROM BEYOND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

Beyond these fundamental dispositions toward authority, order and agency
that motivate the empathic psychoclass, are more practical issues that affect
the conditions of emergence of the New School. Issues such as size and
scale, the function and aesthetics of the physical environment, the adult–
child politics of an emergent curriculum (who gets to decide what?) and the
organisation of parental relationships with and commitments to the school
are fundamental, and can be addressed both theoretically and empirically,
given the multiplying examples of New School features we already find in
the world, and their on-going proliferation. But I would like to return in
closing to the question of the school as disruption. What is the New School,
in its identity as a countercultural institution, an adult–child collective in the
service of the emergence of new habits and even new forms of knowledge,
interrupting? It seems obvious that it is challenging the hegemony of the
corporate state in multiple ways, major sectors of which are at this moment
working, through strategic application of what Naomi Klein (2008) has
called the ‘shock doctrine’—or the disruption and subsequent takeover and
privatisation of large sectors of public education by corporate agents (Karp,
2015; Lekar, 2015; Ravitch, 2014). The corporate ‘reform’ agenda is sold
to the US public by mainstream media through at least six not necessarily
connected discourses: data that demonstrate the general failure of public
schools to produce literacies of any sort at any but the most mediocre
levels; a populist right-libertarian discourse of free market fundamentalism;
the application of a business-model of strict, measurable ‘accountability’
to educational practice as a whole; a curricular and pedagogical model
anchored in essentialist epistemological convictions; a received view of
the child/student as necessarily a ‘human resource’ for present and future
capitalist economies; and a crisis narrative that identifies ‘austerity’ as the
only solution for the increasingly scarce resources devoted to the commons
in late capitalist polities.
What is interesting about the present moment is that it at least invokes a
dialectical possibility—a moment of negation in the emergence of searing
contradictions—in which the dystopic and conflict-ridden character of the
debate surrounding education renders the lineaments of the New School vision all the more imaginable. The growing numbers of US parents who, for
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example, are now refusing to subject their children to a draconian schedule
of summative standardised tests of doubtful quality and use (see Karp, 2015)
are functioning in the empathic mode, as are the ever-growing home schooling and unschooling movements. One paradox of the current situation is that
the New School philosophy of small, independent, de-centralised schools
is reflected as in a distorting mirror in the right-wing libertarian push for
privatisation in the form of vouchers and small charter schools, which critics accurately identify as a vehicle for the capture of the ‘market’ by large,
corporate charter school chains (Conniff, 2014), and which exemplify the
very worst qualities of the public schools they seek to replace. But a paradox
is seldom if ever resolved by a foreseen solution, and it could be that the
resolution of this one will open a space for more universal acceptance of
the neotenic laboratory that the New School represents that has not been
opened before. To return to our original metaphor, we might say that the
‘village’ may now be understood as the ‘global village’, which is being
disrupted by a new ‘village school’ in the form of the New School, whose
teachers are representative of a new psychoclass—that is a class of adults
that practice empathic childrearing and foster social democracy and direct
democratic practice. As empathic practitioners, these new visitors from beyond the village represent an emergent planetary postmodern socius, all of
whom recognise the evolutionary significance of neoteny and the profound
cultural, social and material value of our paedomorphic species traits—who
can say, with Schiller (1976[1795], p.85), ‘They [children] are what we
were; they are what we should once again become. We were nature just as
they, and our culture, by means of reason and freedom, should lead us back
to nature. They are, therefore, not only the representation of our lost childhood . . . but they are also representations of our highest fulfillment . . . ’.
Whether ‘reason and freedom’ can ‘lead us back to nature’ is at present a
contested notion; but if they can, it will be in the company of children.3
Correspondence: David Kennedy, Professor, Department of Educational
Foundations, Montclair State University, Montclair NJ 07043.
Email: kennedyd@mail.montclair.edu

NOTES
1. DeMause’s theory is widely contested among historians and psychologists for its flawed historiography, its naı̈ve stage theory, and its broad application of Freudian principles to historical analysis.
It has, however, supported enough research and scholarship to maintain an academic journal for
nearly 50 years and undergone further refinement (e.g. Petschauer, 1989), and I use it here for its
power to invoke a unified theory of the adult–child relationship, its expression in culture, and its
influence on educational form.
2. An extremely short list of members of this group would include at least Francisco Ferrer (2017)
Herbert Reid (1944), Colin Ward (Burke and Jones, 2014), Murray Bookchin (2004), Paul Goodman
(2010), George Dennison (1969), Noam Chomsky (2013), Pierre Clastres (1987) Todd May (1994)
and David Graeber (2004).
3. This paper appeared in an altered form and in Italian translation in Civitas Educationis. Education, Politics, and Culture, 5.2 (2016), and is published with that journal’s permission
(www.civitaseducationis.eu - http://www.mimesisedizioni.it/riviste/civitas-educationis.html).
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